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ABSTRACT. Although shorefast sea ice forms a platform that facilitates travel, camping, and hunting by Iñupiat subsistence
hunters and fishers in the western Arctic, the nearshore sea-ice zone remains an unforgiving and dynamic environment. Traditional
hunters constantly hone site-specific experiences and skills with which to optimize the reward-to-risk ratio inherent in operating
from this coastal ice. Nearshore ice conditions nevertheless can change suddenly, endangering even the most experienced
subsistence hunters. This study examines two (of several) 20th-century events, 40 years apart, in which shorefast ice failed,
threatening Iñupiat whale hunters with loss of confidence, livelihood, and life. These events differed in character. In one event,
the shorefast ice was “crushed” by moving ice floes. In the other, the shorefast ice broke free of land. Our examination focuses
on the relationship of subsistence hunters to the ice, the environmental causes of ice failures, the evolving technology for predicting
ice behavior, and the longer-term implications of global change for this system. The complexity of geophysical processes
underlying coastal ice behavior makes ice failures unpredictable. Thus, hunters must assume and manage risk. The variable and
uncertain environment to which whale hunters are accustomed has produced an inherent flexibility that has helped them adapt to
new conditions and will continue to do so in the future.
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RÉSUMÉ. Bien que la banquise côtière constitue une plate-forme qui permet aux Iñupiat de l’Arctique de l’Ouest de se déplacer
et de camper lorsqu’ils pratiquent la chasse et la pêche de subsistance, la zone de banquise proche du littoral reste un milieu
dynamique qui ne pardonne pas. Les chasseurs traditionnels améliorent constamment les habiletés et l’expérience reliées à des
sites particuliers, qui leur permettent d’optimiser le rapport récompense-risque inhérent au fait de travailler depuis la glace côtière.
Les conditions de cette dernière peuvent toutefois changer brusquement, mettant en danger même les chasseurs de subsistance
les plus chevronnés. Cette étude se penche sur deux (parmi plusieurs) épisodes survenus au XXe siècle, à 40 ans d’écart, durant
lesquels la banquise côtière s’est rompue, ébranlant la confiance des baleiniers Iñupiat et menaçant leur moyen de subsistance ainsi
que leur vie. Ces événements étaient de nature différente. Dans l’un, la glace côtière avait été «écrasée» par des floes en dérive.
Dans l’autre, la banquise côtière s’était détachée de la terre ferme. Notre étude se concentre sur le rapport entre les chasseurs de
subsistance et la glace, les causes environnementales de la fragilisation de la glace, la technologie mise au point actuellement qui
permettrait de prédire le comportement de la glace, et les implications à long terme du changement climatique pour ce système.
La complexité des processus géophysiques sous-jacents au comportement de la banquise côtière fait que les ruptures de la banquise
sont imprévisibles. Les chasseurs doivent donc assumer le risque et le gérer. L’environnement variable et incertain auquel sont
accoutumés les chasseurs de baleine leur a donné une souplesse inhérente qui les a aidés à s’adapter à de nouvelles conditions et
continuera de le faire dans l’avenir.
Mots clés: Iñupiat, banquise, sécurité, débâcle, vêlage, banquise côtière, chasse, technologie, chasse à la baleine, Barrow
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INTRODUCTION
Sea ice is a defining characteristic not only of the Arctic,
but also of Iñupiat hunting practices in northern Alaska
(Nelson, 1969; Stonehouse, 1989). For the hunters,
shorefast sea ice provides an essential platform for winter
and spring hunting, particularly for the bowhead whale
(Balaena mysticetus) during its annual spring migration
along the Alaska coast of the Chukchi Sea. Despite its
name, the shorefast ice is a dynamic and unstable environ-
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ment, particularly along its seaward edge (Shapiro, 1976;
Reimnitz et al., 1978). Successful hunting depends to a
great extent on the hunters’ understanding of the ice on which
they travel, hunt, and camp (Nelson, 1969). Excessive
caution may keep hunters too far from their prey. Disre-
gard for possible movement of the shorefast ice, on the
other hand, can lead to stranding, loss of gear, or even
death. Because the ice varies greatly from year to year and
place to place, and because it is part of an interrelated
system of currents, winds, ice structure, and water level,
successful hunters require a detailed understanding of a
complex set of environmental parameters, and as we will
demonstrate, “luck” and stochastic factors are important
too (Nelson, 1966, 1982; Hibler, 1986). Despite the hunt-
ers’ expertise and caution, however, mishaps and acci-
dents do occur.
Shorefast ice is also of considerable interest in the
context of sea-ice geophysics. Ice-ocean interaction is
affected by shorefast ice, which restricts or attenuates the
transfer of momentum from atmosphere to ocean and
represents an important constraint for nearshore tidal forc-
ing. That is, if the ice is held in place, as shorefast ice is,
the surface ocean circulation changes dramatically. The
shorefast ice is furthermore associated with complex
thermohaline circulation features both inshore and off-
shore of the shorefast-ice edge, including effects on the
transfer of terrestrial freshwater into the marine system
(Dmitrenko et al., 1999; Macdonald, 2000). Interaction of
polar pack ice with the shorefast ice is important for ice-
pack dynamics, often resulting in the creation of leads and
pressure ridges in the Beaufort Sea (Richter-Menge et al.,
2002). In contrast to the Beaufort ice, coastal sea ice in
Alaska’s northern Chukchi Sea is dominated by a flaw
zone or polynya, which extends approximately 100 km
seaward of the outer edge of shorefast ice. Norton and
Gaylord (2004, this volume) propose that this zone is
distinguished from “true” polar pack ice (particularly in
late winter) by consisting of varying extents of open water
and small, highly mobile ice floes and pans.
Flaw leads or polynyas that form along the shorefast-ice
margin are not just of local significance; they also affect the
ventilation of the deeper Arctic Ocean through the formation
of dense water masses (Winsor and Chapman, 2002). Coastal
ice dynamics leave their mark on shorelines. Shorefast ice
helps protect the coastline and nearshore sediments from
wave erosion, but it may contribute to sediment transport, for
example, during onshore ice-push events (Iñupiaq: ivu; Kovacs
and Sodhi, 1980). Thus, shorefast ice affects and can be
affected by a wide range of environmental factors, although
many of the details are poorly understood scientifically.
Iñupiat knowledge of the ice can contribute to scientific
understanding in several ways: for example, by identifying
the roles of local forces on ice dynamics and, particularly, the
ways in which changes in sea ice will affect whale hunters and
other ice-dependent hunters.
This paper explores the ways in which sea-ice dynamics
affect Iñupiat hunters and how social changes such as modern
navigation and communication technology affect Iñupiat
use of their sea-ice knowledge. It is based on years of
discussions with Iñupiat hunters and our direct experience
of over 20 years of camping and conducting research on
the shorefast ice. We also draw from formal oral history
interviews, from archival research, and from two case
studies developed for and discussed during the Barrow
Symposium on Sea Ice, held in October–November 2000
(Huntington et al., 2001, 2002; Norton, 2002). In that
symposium, Iñupiat hunters and sea-ice researchers dis-
cussed their respective understandings of the sea-ice envi-
ronment and its implications for humans. This paper is an
outgrowth of the collaborative research and exchange of
ideas that characterized the symposium and each of our
own research methodologies within Iñupiat communities.
We examine two case studies that were developed in detail
for the Barrow Symposium, amplified by recent events
(2002), which are similar to the second case study (1997).
The first case study examines a catastrophic breakup of
shorefast ice in May 1957, and the second a large calving
event in May 1997 that stranded at least 142 hunters (and
others who managed to rescue themselves). The 1957
event was apparently unprecedented in size, severity, and
extent, although smaller “collision” events of this type
occur nearly every season. Large-scale calving events
have occurred roughly five times in 20 years (1980 –
2000), but the 1997 event involved the greatest number of
people. Because they describe events that caught the whale
hunters by surprise, the two case studies are relevant to
questions of global environmental change. As changes
affect sea ice, will the knowledge of hunters and others
who use that environment be able to keep pace? For
instance, with deteriorating spring ice conditions, one
possible adaptation would be for the Barrow whale hunters
to focus more heavily on the autumn whale hunt. Or will
the environment pose greater challenges in the form of
more frequent accidents, particularly if conditions are
outside previous experience and expectation? Examining
past events illustrates how communities respond to sur-
prises. In terms of human dimensions research, this is a
particularly compelling area for understanding the poten-
tial effects of global change both on traditional activities
and on the cultural aspects of environmental knowledge.
These case studies are based on extensive narratives
prepared from interviews with whale hunters and informa-
tion from other sources, such as weather records, remote
sensing data, and archival material. For this paper, three
points are relevant, as described in more detail below.
First, the breakup of shorefast ice is the result of many
factors that defy reduction to simple variables or warning
signs. Whale hunters, in their uncertainty about these
factors, tend to err on the side of caution. Second, the
presence of technology may cause some hunters to become
overconfident and therefore less cautious. Whale hunters
lacked even radios and weather forecasts in 1957, but were
equipped with two-way radios, GPS units, snow machines,
and search-and-rescue capabilities in 1997. Third, the
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lasting impact of the experiences on those involved ap-
pears to depend in part on the degree to which the whale
hunters felt they were at risk or, conversely, to which they
or the search-and-rescue teams were able to control the
situation.
The main objectives of this paper are 1) to describe the
Iñupiat reliance on sea ice and the risk associated with that
reliance; 2) to describe the shorefast ice platform, the
inherent unpredictability of shorefast ice dynamics, and
recent changes in sea-ice character/stability; and 3) to
examine natural and societal factors that influence deci-
sion making about risk.
THE IÑUPIAT AND SEA ICE
Iñupiat hunters travel, camp, and hunt on sea ice.
Shorefast ice is unique, being neither marine nor terrestrial
but combining elements of both. Shorefast ice is used from
late fall, when it attains enough strength to support a
person, through the spring, when it melts and breaks up.
For millennia, humans in the Arctic have depended on sea
ice as a substrate for human activity as well as a habitat for
marine mammals and other prey species. During that time,
hunting communities have accumulated considerable
knowledge about the ice, its characteristics, and its
dangers (Nelson, 1966, 1969, 1982; Okakok, 1981). This
expertise was the foundation for the Barrow Symposium
on Sea Ice, during which the Iñupiat participants described
some aspects of their understanding of and relationship
with sea ice.
In the waters off Barrow, hunters recognize three basic
sea-ice zones, each with its own ice types and dynamics
(Figs. 1, 2). First is the innermost zone of shorefast ice
(tuvaq), the extent of which varies within and between years.
It consists of first-year ice mixed with varying amounts of
multi-year ice. Second is a band that includes the open lead
(uiñiq), sometimes referred to as the flaw lead, and the ice
fragments moving loosely within this alongshore flaw lead.
This band, where seal and whale hunting take place, is a
highly dynamic region and is used with caution. Third is the
outer realm of ice pack (sarri), which in the northern Chukchi
Sea of Alaska consists of variable, high-velocity currents and
constantly shifting sea ice that hunters regard as particularly
dangerous. Iñupiat of the northern Chukchi Sea coast of
Alaska rarely hunt in this outer section of the flaw zone.
Hunters from Little Diomede Island in the Bering Strait, by
contrast, make little use of shorefast ice, but have mastered
remarkable skills for hunting and traveling on moving sea ice
(John Burns, pers. comm. 1997).
The shorefast ice system at Barrow is complex: at any one
instant, it reflects combined effects of wind, currents,
FIG. 1. Generalized representation of coastal sea ice along the northern Chukchi Sea coast from Point Hope to Barrow, with English and Iñupiaq names for some
of the ice structures (illustration by Deb Coccia).
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interaction with the offshore ice pack and the seafloor, and the
qualities of the ice itself. The presence of multi-year ice,
which is thicker and stronger than first-year ice and often
grounds in shallow water, affects the behavior of the shorefast
ice that is undergoing stress (as explored in the first case study
below). The patterns of winds and currents during fall and
winter are critical to the formation of the ice, the grounded
pressure ridges, and the multi-year ice pans that help give it
stability. Understanding the susceptibility of the ice to subse-
quent winds and currents requires knowing the conditions
under which it formed. For example, hunters keep track of the
direction of ice movement during accretion of the shorefast
ice and the direction and magnitude of the winds that created
the grounded pressure ridges.
One of the Iñupiat hunters’ main concerns is safety. The
hunters often discuss ice conditions and dangers among
themselves, in terms of specific conditions during the
whaling season and generally throughout the year. The
placement of whaling camps and other significant activi-
ties is based on careful appraisal of the hazards of the ice
and the desirability of locations for hunting (Nelson,
1982). The whale hunters, whose camps include extensive
and expensive equipment, avoid risk to life and property
by retreating behind grounded pressure ridges when mov-
ing pack ice closes the lead or conditions pose other threats
to the edge of the shorefast ice.
The traditional emphasis on safety and caution is illus-
trated with numerous past events in which the ice broke
off, carrying hunters and their camps out to sea. The oral
history record includes age-old stories about hunters drift-
ing out, or getting into life-threatening situations, on
moving sea ice, and recent hunters also talk about similar
experiences of their own (North Slope Borough, 1980;
Okakok, 1981). The prevalence of these stories indicates
that ice break-offs and risky ice conditions have been
regular occurrences in the past. Despite the accumulation
of considerable knowledge by Iñupiat hunters, the Arctic
sea-ice environment can catch people by surprise (Fig. 3a, b).
The retelling of these stories and personal observations
among Iñupiat hunters is an important way in which they
try to avoid such accidents. Critical knowledge is passed
on to inexperienced young hunters, emphasizing the im-
portance of paying attention to the ice and to safety
(Nelson, 1982).
One recent ice break-off event is described in the sec-
ond case study below. The several interpretations of these
events range from changing ice conditions to the loss of
knowledge about sea ice to a reliance on—and faith in—
communication and emergency rescue technology, such as
two-way radios, global positioning system units (GPS),
and rescue helicopters. The impacts of such technology on
risk assessment by the whale hunters is hard to determine,
but some community members express concern that mod-
ern gadgetry is replacing detailed knowledge of sea ice. An
analogy for non-Natives is the criticism of modern moun-
tain climbers that they “carry their skills in their backpacks”
(high-tech ice tools, GPS, rock-bolts, high-tech clothing,
etc.), but lack the thorough mountaineering knowledge of
earlier generations of climbers.
SEA-ICE DYNAMICS
At Barrow, freeze-up typically occurs in November, but
the formation of stable shorefast ice may be delayed.
Stability is achieved after one or more significant pack ice
“shoves” deform and ground the ice. Grounding can take
place as late as January—or not at all. Thin, ungrounded,
maturing ice in the nearshore area is vulnerable. A strong
offshore wind can tear away young ice all the way to the
beach, leaving open water even when winter temperatures
are low. In “cold years,” the ice tends to stabilize by
November, but recently ice has been (more) unstable, with
episodes of shorefast ice breaking off at the beach as late
as January or February, or almost to the beach, as in March
2002. Late-season break-offs significantly affect the ice
conditions the whale hunters will face in the spring. Since
formation of the shorefast platform has to re-start, the ice
will take longer to stabilize and mature.
Once grounded and stabilized, the shorefast ice cover
remains in place until the start of breakup in late spring and
early summer. In winter, interaction between the offshore
ice pack, (sarri, which responds to wind and ocean forc-
ing) and the shorefast ice can result in rapid deformation of
a few metres within hours (Weeks et al., 1977) or thicken-
ing and strengthening of ridges over longer periods
(Shapiro, 1976; Reimnitz et al., 1978). This interaction
typically does not lead to disintegration or break-off of
shorefast ice, but rather tends to increase its stability by
increasing the loading of grounded pressure ridges along
the outer margins, where much of the deformation occurs
(Fig. 1; Shapiro, 1976; Reimnitz et al., 1978). Further
elements that add to the stability of the shorefast ice are
grounded multi-year ice floes and smaller ridges that were
FIG. 2. Oblique aerial view of shorefast ice, tuvaq, looking NE from Barrow
toward Point Barrow on 6 March 2000. English and Iñupiaq names are given
for the ice types shown. Dashed line shows approximate limit of grounded ice.
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blown close to shore prior to or during freeze-up (Fig. 1;
Shapiro, 1976).
The dynamics and breakup or decay of the complex
shorefast ice cover, comprising different zones and units,
is difficult to predict. Other than simple ice-melt models
that predict the overall thinning through melting (Bilello,
1980), we are not aware of any work that addresses this
problem for the type of ice encountered along the northern
coast of Alaska. Some progress has been made in assessing
the role of wave dynamics in the breakup of flat fast-ice
sheets of homogeneous thickness and properties that bor-
der on deep, open water (Squire, 1993), but shorefast ice in
most Alaskan locations does not conform to such a simple
geometry. Russian researchers have addressed this prob-
lem for the simpler configuration of sea ice in the Laptev
Sea (Spichkin, 1961). Ice-sheet flexural oscillations at
periods of tens of seconds to several minutes have been
tentatively identified as precursors to ice breakup, and
recent modeling suggests that there may be links between
such oscillations and the impact of shelf gravity waves
(Marchenko et al., 2002). Similar oscillations have been
recorded in the shorefast ice at Barrow, where “waves”
with an amplitude of 2 – 8 cm and a period of five to ten
minutes occur (Shapiro and Metzner, 1989:18; North Slope
Borough, 1999 – 2002; Norton, 2002).
Satellite remote sensing can help provide data on the
breakup of shorefast ice (e.g., Barry et al., 1979). Data of
sufficient ground resolution to allow conclusions about
actual processes and smaller-scale events have only
recently become available, however (Hirose and Vachon,
1998). Satellite-borne synthetic aperture radar (SAR) can
discriminate between shorefast ice, water in an open lead,
and drifting ice (Fig. 4). With an effective resolution of
about 50 to 100 m, SAR is particularly useful in studying
the evolution of coastal ice. Orbit repeat times, which
range from a few days to three weeks, make near–real-time
observations of fast-ice deformation problematic, whereas
successive SAR images are useful in tracking movement
of floes in the Chukchi flaw zone (Norton and Gaylord,
2004, this volume). SAR images, however, do provide
some insight into the morphology, zonation, and compo-
nent floes of the shorefast ice zone. Considering the
strengths and weaknesses of satellite remote sensing, data
sets that would be useful for the development of concep-
tual and numerical models of breakup and decay of shorefast
sea ice would probably entail a combination of several
data sources. These include remote sensing, ground-based
observations at different locations on the ice sheet, a
marine radar providing near-continuous, near–real-time
data on ice evolution and deformation at a scale of several
kilometres (Shapiro, 1976), and the relevant meteorologi-
cal and atmospheric forcing data sets.
The increased frequency of winter and early spring
break-off events and shortened sea-ice seasons (Huntington,
2000) suggests that the coastal sea-ice system has been
responding to some of the recent changes observed in the
Arctic atmosphere and ocean (Serreze et al., 2000) and that
the shorefast ice regime has become more dynamic. Sig-
nificant gaps remain in our understanding of ice breakup
and decay, as was shown by the inability to predict the ice
break-off events in the winter of 2001 – 02.
On the morning of 11 December 2001, significant parts
of the shorefast ice cover broke off and drifted away
FIG. 3. a) Whale-hunting crew retreating to shore across a widening crack in
1988 (Photo: Bill Hess, Running Dog Publications).
FIG. 3. b) An ivu or ice-ridging event that formed an unusual (12 – 13 m) ridge
in the shorefast ice near Barrow, after it was hit by pack ice (May 2003). Such
events often happen quickly (10 – 20 minutes) and can threaten hunters, camps,
and equipment (Photo: J.C. George).
a b
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between the town of Barrow and Utqiagvik Inupiat Corpo-
ration-NARL (see Fig. 4 for location). Later in the same
winter, on 17 March 2002, another break-off event caught
18 seal hunters and a whaling crew off-guard, and all had
to be rescued by helicopter. Following these pre-whaling
season events, the shorefast ice grew back. Although the
“regrown” ice did not achieve the thickness of the undis-
turbed ice that had started forming in November 2001
(1.6 m off NARL), the lack of a significant snow cover did
allow for substantial ice growth (over 1 m). The final event
of the 2002 season occurred when a major portion of the
shorefast ice broke up in May and took more than 50 whale
hunters out to sea. They, too, had to be rescued by boats
and helicopter.
Although more research is needed to explain the envi-
ronmental factors responsible for these events, it is likely
that 1) the lack of grounded multi-year ice floes and 2) the
reduced pressure ridges (both along the offshore ice edge
and over shoals within the shorefast ice zone; Shapiro,
1976) tend to increase the likelihood of early break-off and
breakup events. Lack of multi-year ice as a stabilizing
component of the shorefast cover can be directly traced to
the large-scale reductions in summer minimum pack-ice
extent in the Chukchi and Beaufort seas (Serreze et al.,
2000; Harry Brower, Jr. pers. comm. 2000).
Alternatively, the lack of multi-year floes in the shorefast
ice can be ascribed to the weather systems occurring just
before freeze-up. Sometimes many multi-year floes are blown
in, as happened in fall 2001, and at other times the ocean
“freezes in place,” with few or no multi-year floes present.
Even in the latter case, multi-year floes can be incorporated
into the shorefast edge if they “migrate” in from the west over
the winter and are accreted to the existing ice by strong
westerly winds and currents. The reduced ridging observed in
2000–01 and 2001–02 was due to a number of factors,
including the local meteorological regime. Moreover, it is not
clear whether reduced ice thickness (1.5 to 1.6 m in recent
years, as compared to about 1.8 m in the 1970s; Weeks and
Gow, 1978) enhances or diminishes the degree of ridging.
Early winter break-off events nevertheless tend to increase
the likelihood of early spring breakup. Since less time is
available for the formation of thick ice, for multi-year floes to
freeze in, and for interaction between moving ice floes and
shorefast ice to produce the grounded pressure ridges that
buttress the shorefast ice, early winter break-offs leave the
shorefast ice generally thinner and weaker.
FIG. 4. A synthetic aperture radar satellite scene (1 May 2001) centered on Barrow, Alaska, showing shorefast ice and the “lead system” with drifting fragmented
ice  (sometimes referred to as the “flaw zone”) farther offshore. Note the iiguaq (multi-year ice that attached to the shorefast ice). The dotted white line shows where
the iiguaq attached in late March 2001. The iiguaq appears lighter in this image than the nearby shorefast ice, which consisted mostly of first-year ice.
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1957: CATASTROPHIC BREAKUP
In early May 1957, Barrow’s whaling crews were at the
ice edge looking for whales, in clear, calm weather. The
wind began to increase from the southwest, building rap-
idly to 40 km/h with stronger gusts. The water level rose
from the storm surge, and soon floes at the edge of the ice
pack (sarri) were seen, moving rapidly towards the edge of
the shorefast ice. The whale hunters rushed to pack their
gear and retreat, but the moving ice came too fast. When
moving ice hits the shorefast ice, the latter often buckles at
the edge to produce a new pressure ridge, but there is little
visible impact away from the edge. However, this is not
always the case: the effect of an impact depends on the
thickness of the moving floes, the thickness and strength
of the shorefast ice, and the velocity with which the
moving ice hits (Fig. 3b).
In 1957, the shorefast ice simply shattered all the way to
shore (but not up the beach) when the pack ice smashed into
it. The whale hunters were shocked. Their retreat turned into
a scramble for the safety of shore, with sled dogs cut loose and
equipment abandoned. Remarkably, no lives were lost. None-
theless, it took years for many of the crews to recover and
acquire new equipment. By any reckoning, it was an extraor-
dinary event (Huntington et al., 2001, 2002; Norton, 2002;
K. Toovak, Sr., pers. comm. 2003; Brewster, 2004).
The sudden onset of a strong storm from the southwest
appears in Barrow’s weather records several times in the
20th century. But we know of no other accounts that
connect such weather to the nearly complete destruction of
shorefast ice. Indeed, there is no other record of shorefast
ice shattering in this particular manner, which helps ex-
plain why the whale hunters were caught off-guard. Re-
view of weather records and reconstruction of the storm
indicate that a deep low-pressure system was moving north
over eastern Siberia (Norton, 2002). As a result, 90-knot
(~165 km/h) SW winds just south of the Bering Strait
pushed water up the coast in the form of a surge, which
lifted the shorefast ice and increased its susceptibility to
breaking up. Sea-level surges accompany west and south-
westerly storms, but since no other storm produced this
effect on the shorefast ice, the ice type itself may have been
the decisive factor.
 In that year, there may have been an unusually high
proportion of salt-free, multi-year ice, known in Iñupiaq as
piqaluyak, incorporated into the shorefast ice. Piqaluyak
refers to a specific type of multi-year ice. Floes can be as
much as 10 m thick, and are derived from old, compacted
pressure ridges that have survived two or more seasons of
freezing and thawing (riverine or glacial contributions to
piqaluyak are thought to be rare). During successive sum-
mers, some of the surface ice melts, percolates through the
underlying ice, and flushes out the denser, entrapped
brine, thereby “freshening” the ice. Piqaluyak floes have
many properties not found in regular first-year ice floes.
Because of the leaching of the brine and its replacement by
relatively fresh water, piqaluyak floes yield excellent
potable water that is used by the whaling crews. Piqaluyak
floes are harder and more brittle. Within the shorefast ice
setting, they can take considerable force, but when they
eventually break, they can shatter like glass, occasionally
in an “explosive” manner. This brittleness contrasts to the
less violent flexing, fracturing, and ridging of the more
saline first-year floes.
That the whale hunters were caught off guard is perhaps
the most significant part of the story. There were few
indications of an imminent storm, and in 1957, there was
no radio station to broadcast weather forecasts that would
warn those on the ice about changing conditions. There
was little warning of disaster from any source. Once it
became apparent that ice was moving in from farther
offshore, the crews attempted to retreat to safe ice behind
the grounded pressure ridges, a strategy that usually offers
sufficient protection. In this case, the pressure ridges did
not hold against the force of the incoming ice, and they
broke up along with the piqaluyak floes that had been
incorporated into the shorefast ice. This event emphasized
to whale hunters what their elders had taught them about
the insecurity of flat, wide pans of multi-year, salt-free
piqaluyak. Since the 1957 event, younger whale hunters
have been told to avoid camping or seeking refuge on
piqaluyak.
For the whale hunters involved, the event was powerful
and memorable. Many regarded themselves lucky to have
made it to shore, despite losing all the gear they had taken
on the ice. The whale hunters are aware that the ice is not
always predictable. Their elders trained them to watch the
wind and current at all times, and to retreat quickly under
certain conditions. Despite their best efforts, they were
caught off guard and nearly became victims of a disaster.
Subsequent generations of whale hunters have been taught
the lessons learned in the first week of May 1957. Weather
forecasts now provide advance notice of incoming storms—
a key new development. Forecasts allow whale hunters
time to assess the conditions and risks and decide whether
to remain or retreat. Nonetheless, as the next case study
shows, there are other ways of being caught by surprise.
1997: WHALE HUNTERS STRANDED
BY AN ICE-CALVING EVENT
The shorefast ice is not static. Portions of the ice can
break off, an event known as “calving,” which is one of the
major hazards of the shorefast ice (Fig. 3a). The Iñupiat
term uisauniq has been translated as “a calving event
involving people,” [uisau ‘to be stranded on an ice floe in
the ocean’ + niq ‘to report or confirm that the subject is
uisau-ing’] (Maclean, 1980). The existence of this term
gives some indication of the significance of such an occur-
rence. Between 1980 and 2000, five large-scale calving
events took place near Barrow, three of which carried
people out on the newly mobile ice. The calving event of
1997 was the most significant of the five, carrying off 12
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whaling camps with about 142 people, who were eventu-
ally rescued by helicopter. Several more people who were
near the fracture zone returned to land by boat, so the
number of people affected is somewhat greater than 142.
As noted above, shorefast ice is typically held in place
by grounded pressure ridges and, to a lesser extent, by
grounded multi-year ice floes, which anchor the floating
ice to the seabed and prevent winds or currents from
moving it. The pressure ridges are formed when winds and
currents drive pack ice into the shorefast ice, and thus both
the number and the size of the pressure ridges depend
largely on the character of the winds and currents during
the ice season in question. The breakup of these ridges and
the shorefast ice appears to be a complex interaction of
several forces in any number of combinations. Scientists
and the Iñupiat agree that these forces include wind vec-
tors, currents, storm surges, pieces of moving ice floes
acting like a chisel (tuuq in Iñupiaq) on the shorefast ice,
a sudden drop in sea level, possible tsunamis, tides en-
hanced by different phases of the moon, ice-surface and
bottom melt, and the weak points in shorefast ice where
new sections of ice were added. These attached sections of
ice are called iiguaq in Iñupiaq. The point where an iiguaq
attaches is often weak (Table 1).
There is no simple set of indicators that can be moni-
tored to evaluate the risk of calving. Instead, the whale
hunters pay attention to a wide range of parameters and
typically exercise caution by retreating often, despite the
relative infrequency of calving or break-off events. Whale
hunters’ behavior attests to the considerable instability of
the sea-ice environment.
In 1997, much of the shorefast ice had broken off in March,
so that in May, during whaling, the ice was relatively young
and flat, with few grounded pressure ridges to anchor it in
place. Despite strong east (offshore) winds in early May, the
ice did not break off. When the ice did begin to move on 17
May, however, the wind was relatively light.
The current, which was flowing northward or “down-
lead,” had been strong but not alarmingly so; it then began
to strengthen noticeably, to the point that pressure-ridge
blocks were “tumbling” out from under the shorefast ice
and into the lead. With the strengthening current (and the
rise in sea level), tide cracks flooded. The Iñupiat recog-
nize this as an indicator that the ice may be unstable.
However, flooding had been reported several times earlier
in May with no bad effects, so the hunters chose to stay out
on the ice. Weak spots of thin ice or weakly cemented
pressure ridges visible in the trail system also became
weaker. Finally, over VHF radio, a crew reported an active
crack to the southwest. Within hours, much of the shorefast
ice was in motion toward the northeast. It did not move as
a single mass, but fractured into many pieces. The ice
broke where the March iiguaq, consisting of younger and
thinner ice, had been attached.
TABLE 1. Western and Iñupiat theories regarding the causes of uisauniq (“major ice calving events involving people”).
Western Science:
Cause
Stress from offshore winds and interactions between pack
ice and fast ice (Reimnitz et al., 1978)
Wind- or current-induced “oscillations” (Shapiro, 1976;
Shapiro and Metzner, 1989)
Storm surge, spring neap-tide, regional oceanographic
circulation (Kozo et al., 1987; R. Page, pers. comm. 2002)
Iñupiat Science:
Cause
Tuuq effect (pack ice collision, often distant; 1997)
Sudden tide or sea level change
Sea-current pressure
“Katak Theory”
Offshore (shore-normal) under-ice current
Ocean waves; and 1964 earthquake effect (?)
Moon tides
Weak areas at iiguaq
Comments
Stresses imparted on the shorefast ice by offshore winds and the ice-pack converging on the
coastal zone may break shorefast ice free.
L. Shapiro noted that major shorefast ice movements were preceded by “oscillations” in the ice
with a 10-minute period.
Storm surges through the Bering Strait may cause sudden increases in sea level and cause
shorefast ice to fail.
Comments
Pack ice acts like a chisel or “tuuq” on the shorefast ice.
Hunters describe sudden changes in sea level that can affect the stability of shorefast ice.
Pressure from sea currents pushing on the shorefast ice cause it to fail.
A sudden “drop” (katak means ‘to fall’) in sea level can crack the shorefast ice near grounded
ridges, causing it to fail at that point (Norton, 2002).
Hunters have observed occasional under-ice, shore-normal currents (perpendicular to the ice
edge) that cause the shorefast ice to break off.
Hunters have described large waves (tsunami) occurring on calm days, possibly from distant
earthquakes (Okakok, 1981). K. Toovak noted that the shorefast ice broke free at Barrow after
the Good Friday earthquake that struck Alaska on 27 March 1964.
Iñupiat hunters recognize the effect of moon phase on tides and instability in shorefast ice.
Shorefast ice is weakest at the junction of two shorefast ice masses, where they “attach” (iiguaq
means “ attachment”).
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Most whaling crews had retreated several times by the
second week of whaling—one crew at least 11 times
(Edward Itta, pers. comm. 1997). Because each retreat
means two moves, the Itta crew moved 22 times. When a
camp is pulled back, the crew usually sets up camp (again)
on the shore side of the first grounded ridge, which is quite
stable, illustrating the caution noted above. Several factors
in the conditions and sequence of events on 17 May caused
the majority of whalers not to retreat in time. A few,
however, did retreat just in time. Harry Brower, Jr. was
chasing a whale, but instructed his crew to leave the ice
after they reported a “jolt” coming from the shorefast ice.
They were able to get all but one crewmember and four of
seven snow machines across the widening crack (Harry
Brower, Jr., pers. comm. 2002). In retrospect, whale hunters
reported noticing indications of danger, but after assessing
the risks, many decided to remain on the ice.
What persuaded the crews to remain on the ice? The fact
that a whale was being towed to a butchering site certainly
influenced their decision. At least five boats were involved in
towing the whale, and their respective crews wanted to stay
on the ice to support them in the hauling, butchering, and
transport of meat. Furthermore, this was the first whale for a
young captain—an important event to the community. Thus,
the “benefits” of retrieving the whale, and possibly harvest-
ing additional whales, outweighed the potential risks (only a
few whales had been landed prior to this).
The divided crews—some towing the whale and some
on the ice—had less opportunity to reach the consensus
normally needed to evacuate the ice. The decision to
evacuate is sometimes the captain’s decision alone (e.g.,
an emergency situation), but more commonly it is a “group
decision” based on consultation with other crews in the
immediate area. Often the same crews camp together each
season and confer with each other. Also, many crews rely
upon consultation with their senior whale hunter, who may
be too elderly to be on the ice, but who gives advice from
onshore over the radio. Weighing and taking calculated
risks, based upon an assessment of conditions, is an essen-
tial part of Iñupiat whale hunting.
It was fortunate that no lives were lost with the strand-
ing of 142 persons on newly drifting ice in the Arctic
Ocean. Thick fog and snow flurries almost immediately
after the break-off reduced visibility to 100 m or less. In
each group where the hunters gathered, at least one person
had a GPS unit, so that whale hunters could direct rescue
helicopters to their precise location by two-way radio. A
few individuals without radios had to set a fire to identify
their position for the helicopter pilot. A few crews launched
their boats and made it back to the shorefast ice by follow-
ing directions given by helicopter pilots, who guided them
through the ice-filled leads.
Without helicopter rescue, crews would have had to be
self-reliant (as in the “old days”) through a combination of
paddling and portaging boats through water and over the
ice to reach land. On the other hand, crews setting out for
shore independently could easily have drifted beyond any
shore-based assistance. Had their progress back toward
land been impeded by steep pressure ridges, crews stranded
on moving ice might have faced loss of life from exposure,
lack of food, or drowning.
DISCUSSION
Neither the 1957 nor the 1997 event can be fully ex-
plained scientifically in terms of what exactly triggered
them. In 1957, the whale hunters identified the presence of
extensive salt-free multi-year ice (piqaluyak) as a factor in
the shorefast ice shattering. The characteristics of sea ice
as understood by sea-ice physicists and Iñupiat hunters,
however, do not help explain what happened, and would
suggest the opposite result: that the presence of multi-year
ice should strengthen rather than weaken the shorefast ice
(Richter-Menge, 1992; Eicken, 2003). Several factors about
which little is known may have played a critical role.
These include the exact composition of the ice, the possi-
bility of failure through mechanisms such as differential
vertical movement, and the effect of differences in thick-
ness between the moving ice and the shorefast ice. Move-
ment of thicker ice floes impinging on thinner shorefast ice
appears to cause more immediate ice-edge damage and
deformation than the opposite situation, when thinner
pack ice hits heavy shorefast ice. On the other hand, some
captains have commented that young ice can place great
pressure on shorefast ice. This is in part due to the momen-
tum associated with such a back-and-ram event, which can
play an important role in the evolution of ice shoves
(Mahoney et al., in press). At the same time, younger ice,
even up to thicknesses of around 1 m, has been observed to
raft and ridge, whereas multi-year ice typically does not
fail and buckle in the open pack. In a coastal setting,
however, substantial stress can build up through integra-
tion of wind and water stress over larger distances, and this
clearly plays an important role in the explanation of such
dramatic failure events. One can argue that the weakening
of the pack ice caused by reduction in multi-year ice and
overall thinning of perennial ice in the Beaufort Sea and
Arctic Ocean (Tucker et al., 2001), in combination with
the lack of onshore multi-year ice, is sufficient to have
made catastrophic winter breakup events much less likely.
Lacking the relevant physical data, we can only speculate
at this stage on the conditions that result in catastrophic
failure of desalinated multi-year ice. Although the tradi-
tional knowledge of coastal inhabitants suggests using
first-year ice as a platform for drifting ice camps, research-
ers prefer thick multi-year ice.
The 1997 event appears more straightforward, at least
to the extent that the March break-off weakened the
shorefast ice—a pattern that was repeated in 2002. None-
theless, it is not clear why the ice broke when it did, or how
the whale hunters could have predicted the particular
moment, in view of the ~11 times that the Itta crew had
retreated from ice that remained solid. Some captains did
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warn the crews to leave the ice as the current speed
increased and the tide cracks flooded. Roy Ahmaogak and
his son left camp shortly before the calving event and were
among the last to cross the ice before stranded crews
drifted northward.
The long-term effects of the near-disaster in 1997 are
less clear than those of the 1957 event. The 1957 event
provided lessons about avoiding camping on brittle
piqaluyak and an appreciation for the availability of weather
forecasts. The effect of the successful rescue in 1997 may
have heightened confidence in search-and-rescue capa-
bilities and raised whale hunters’ threshold of willingness
to retreat to safety. It is premature to draw such a conclu-
sion, but some of the Iñupiat at the Barrow Symposium on
Sea Ice expressed concern that people now take more risks
on the ice because of the safety net provided by modern
technology.
This technological change, which confers many advan-
tages and improvements in safety coupled with the addi-
tional risks noted by the hunters, parallels a more general
societal change in which the wisdom of the elders is passed
on less thoroughly than in the past (e.g., Fehr and Hurst,
1996). Ice knowledge, however, unlike some skills like
dog mushing, is still rich, still useful, and still transferred
to younger hunters.
Alternatively, in the case of sea-ice knowledge, it could
be that the accumulated information about ice held by the
elders is less applicable today because of environmental
change (Norton, 2002). Today’s hunters may find the old
lessons about currents, wind, and ice conditions less useful
than in the past, because the ice and environmental condi-
tions today differ from those studied by their elders. That
is, generations ago the ice may have been more stable and
consistent from year to year (owing to cooler, less stormy
conditions) and therefore more predictable. Instead, to-
day’s hunters have added their own experience to the old
and created a new information base that better reflects
modern ice conditions. Acquiring new technology and the
ability to adapt hunting procedures is well documented in
the literature (Berkes, 2002). An important topic for fur-
ther research is the relative impacts of such societal and
environmental changes on the relationship between Arctic
residents and their environment. In the case of sea ice, one
such line of inquiry is a more detailed study of the impacts
of changing technology on risk perception and behavior.
The present study focuses on a sea-ice environment that
is characterized by the interaction between a compara-
tively narrow shorefast ice zone and the offshore drifting
ice pack. Here, the sea-ice regime is comparable to that in
other coastal communities in the Beaufort and Chukchi
seas (Mahoney et al., in press) and may also apply to St.
Lawrence Island (Krupnik, 2002), as well as to communi-
ties in the Hudson Bay and Baffin Bay area. In the former
region, it is the catastrophic breakup of the ice cover that
is of particular interest, although with a less dynamic
offshore sea-ice environment, melt and disintegration proc-
esses may play a more important role (McDonald et al.,
1997; Fox, 2002). The latter also holds for the Siberian
Arctic, where the broad shorefast-ice extent in the Kara,
Laptev, and East Siberian seas and the differences in
circulation regimes diminish the importance of offshore
ice dynamics from the perspective of coastal residents
(Reimnitz et al., 1994). However, common to all these
coastal areas is the central aspect of anticipating ice breakup,
whether as a catastrophic midwinter event or at the end of
the ice season.
More generally, scientific understanding of the nearshore
zone, including shorefast ice, is likely to remain imperfect
because of the inherent complexity of that environment
(Reimnitz et al., 1978). Further collaborative research
between whale hunters and scientists should look more
systematically (and prospectively) at the ice conditions
and dynamics, and also at the ways in which whale hunters
acquire and use information to assess the ice. The incorpo-
ration of remote-sensing information and regional weather
forecasting, for example, may alter the interpretation of
local indicators or (more likely) may instead be used to
supplement or corroborate firsthand observations. The
impacts of these kinds of changes on traditional under-
standing and the transmission of knowledge between gen-
erations is particularly important to understanding change
and stability in the human-environment relationship of
Arctic communities.
Whale hunting is inherently dangerous. Hunters know
they must subject themselves to considerable risk, and
they are willing to accept consequences that non-hunters
would find unacceptable. Whale hunters are also accus-
tomed to a variable and uncertain environment. This inher-
ent flexibility allows them to adapt to new conditions. The
rapid adoption of new technology to improve safety,
whether it is faster snow machines or GPS units to aid
navigation, illustrates reducing risks. Even for those who
expect the unexpected, there can be serious mishaps, as the
above events indicate.
Our collective understanding of shorefast ice needs to
reflect the ways that people interact with the ice and the
resources that the ice makes accessible. Specifically, sci-
entists must consider people’s uses of sea ice, assessments
of risks and benefits, and their observation and interpreta-
tion of environmental indicators (whether directly or
through modern technology) to predict future trends. The
dynamic nature of the shorefast ice and its effect on Arctic
communities must be considered along with the dynamic
nature of the societies that use it.
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